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Abstract 
We examine trends in union density and union influence in several Asian 
countries While we find considerable variation in union density across the countries in 
our sample, all of the labour movements in these countries experienced membership 
decline in the 1990s. Asian countries also varied on our union influence measure, 
although as a group, their scores were much lower than those of Western nations. We 
examine the pattern of union growth, decline, and influence in each country within the 
differing institutional context of unionism, using a "logics of action" framework. Based 
on our examination of how these institutional contexts are changing, and what we know 
about the strategies of unions, we are not hopeful regarding the near term prospects for 
reversing union decline 
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The goal of the paper is to assess, comparatively, the growth, decline and 
prospects for renewal of trade unions in selected Asian countries. We first examine union 
density and union influence using a new measure that takes into account both the level 
and coverage of collective bargaining. We then explain the diverse national patterns of 
union growth and decline and the levels of union influence that we find, using a new 
logics of action framework. Finally, we assess emerging union strategies to examine the 
potential for union revitalization in these countries. 
We focus primarily on China, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. This is a sample of "convenience" in that we chose only those countries for 
which we could obtain consistent data on density, levels of bargaining and bargaining 
coverage. On the other hand, these are important countries in Asia (in terms of population 
or GDP) with relatively large labour movements (in absolute numbers or density), and 
thus appropriate for this analysis. 
In general, we find that there is variation in union density and levels of trade union 
influence within Asia and a steady decline in union density in the 1990s in all countries. We 
explain these patterns of growth, decline, and influence by referring to the logics underlying 
the institutional context in which unions operate and how those logics have changed over 
time. We inquire into the potential for union revitalization through a survey of current 
trends, and we conclude that Asian unions have much to do before they can reverse the 
declines in membership and improve their influence. 
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Evidence on Union Density and Union Influence 
Union Density 
We use the same measure of trade union density used in the OECD i.e., the 
percentage of union members in the total wage/salaried workforce. Table 1 contains the data 
for our sample. 
Table 1 here 
Table 1 presents a varied picture of union growth and decline. In Japan and 
Singapore, trade union density started to decline in the late 1970s. In Philippines, union 
membership has varied considerably over the years, decreasing under martial law, increasing 
thereafter, and decreasing again in 1990s. Korean union density increased after 
democratisation in 1987, but has also declined in the 1990s. In India, although the reliability 
of official union density data is suspect (Das 2000), data from a variety of different sources 
show the beginnings of a decline in the 1990s. For example, Bhattacherjee (2001:22) shows 
decline in the unions submitting annual "returns" to the central government. Das (2000) 
shows that the rate of union growth has declined sharply— in the state of West Bengal, 
during the nine years (1982-90) in the pre-liberalisation period, 4,380 new unions with a total 
membership of 629,151 were registered. In the nine years following liberalisation, (1991-
1999), the number was 2,686 with 240,624 new members (Das 2000). Thus the rate of new 
formation has also decreased in the 1990s. Taiwan and China both show increasing union 
density in the 1980s, but declining figures in the 1990s, particularly after 1995 in the case of 
Taiwan. The decline in union density in China reported in Table 1 is probably understated. 
Our separate investigation of the number of union members shows that while trade union 
membership increased from 51.62 million in 1979 to 103.99 million in 1995, it declined 
to 89.13 million in 1998, a 15% drop. The density data in Table 1 show only a 9% drop 
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during the same period. 
While there is variation across countries in the pattern of growth and decline prior to 
the 1990s, the common pattern of decline in the 1990s led us to examine the argument that 
this decline is due to a change in economic structure with employment shifts from industry to 
services. The data on economic structure changes (this data is available from the authors, but 
is also published by numerous international organizations) suggest that the change in 
economic structure is consistent with declining density in Japan, Singapore, and Korea, but 
not in China, Taiwan, India, and the Philippines. In the latter countries, union decline has 
occurred even as the percentage of employment in industry has been increasing. Thus, 
idiosyncratic country-specific reasons are particularly important in explaining union density 
changes in many Asian countries. 
There are some problems with using the union density variable alone as an indicator 
of the significance of unions. First, unions in Asia are not homogenous. They mean different 
things in different societies. Second, unions are defined differently in different countries. 
Third, there are differences in how wage employment is calculated. Fourth, union 
membership data collection systems (national surveys versus data from union reports) differ 
in their reliability. Hence, we use an additional measure to examine the significance of 
unions in Asia. 
Union Influence 
Our measure, called "Union Influence" is a proxy for labour union's ability to 
represent its potential membership as well as its influence in the socioeconomic sphere. We 
combine two different variables to create our measure. 
The first variable concerns union influence in the socioeconomic sphere. We follow 
the well-established literature in using the level of bargaining (or the extent of bargaining 
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centralisation) as a proxy for union influence on various socio-economic issues such as 
unemployment, inflation and inequality (see Bruno and Sachs 1985; Calmfors and Driffil 
1988; Iversen 1999; Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991; Schmitter 1981; Soskice 1990; 
Western 1997). There are several problems with measures of the level of bargaining, 
however. The first problem is that measuring the degree of centralisation or decentralisation 
is not easy, given that some subjects (e.g. wages) are bargained at central level while others 
(such as working conditions/benefits) may be bargained at the local level. Second, the degree 
of centralisation changes over time. Third, worker involvement in shop floor decision-
making often takes place at times at an informal level. Fourth, the level at which bargaining 
takes place does not say much about the scope of bargaining (Ruysseveldt and Visser 1992). 
In our Asian sample, the scope (what the parties can bargain about) in many countries is 
severely restricted. Although we cannot do much about the bargaining scope issue (we do 
not have all the data to model variations in scope), we can improve the extent of 
centralisation measure by incorporating a) the levels of bargaining, b) identifying which level 
is dominant, and c) including changes in bargaining structure over time. 
Our second variable is the unions' ability to represent their potential membership. 
Any such measure must incorporate the bargaining systems' breadth (coverage). Bargaining 
coverage is important because it tells us how many people are actually covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, a direct measure of union effects. 
It is true that bargaining coverage and the levels of bargaining are likely to be 
correlated (in general, more centralized regimes have higher coverage). We still require both 
measures however, given that in some countries high coverage is due to factors other than 
centralisation (e.g., rules that extend collective agreements to the rest of industry, such as in 
France). Further, these two variables represent analytically different constructs. 
Centralisation (bargaining levels) is used as a proxy for union influence in the national socio-
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economic sphere, while coverage is indicative of union success in representing its 
membership. 
We use data on bargaining levels and bargaining coverage that has been collected by 
the ILO. Since the ILO data show the levels of bargaining in each nation, which level 
dominates in each nation, as well as the trend for the last 10 years (the direction of change in 
bargaining structure), these data are more informative than a simple classification of different 
bargaining levels in each country used in previous research. This data is shown in Table 2, 
along with the bargaining coverage data from the ILO. Columns 1-3 of Table 2 reports the 
primary data on levels of bargaining, which levels are dominant, what is the trend regarding 
levels. Column 4 of Table 2 shows the percentage of workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements—a fairly straightforward measure. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
In order to use the ILO data on levels meaningfully, we create a new extent of 
centralisation variable as shown in Table 3 below. Our scheme assumes a standard degree of 
difference between each level (which may not be warranted). 
Insert Table 3 here 
We then combine the extent of centralisation variable and the bargaining coverage 
variable to create our indicator of union influence. We use the percentages reported in Table 
2 (column 4) to express coverage rates as ranging from 0-1. When all workers are covered by 
collective bargaining (100% coverage) then coverage takes on the value of 1. Where there is 
no bargaining at all, the value is zero. Our measure of union influence is the product of the 
centralisation (levels of bargaining) variable and bargaining coverage Its values range 
from 0 to 5. This measure allows us to make comparisons across countries in a systematic 
way despite differing conceptions of unions and the imperfections associated with the union 
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density measure in Asia Further, increases in a country's score on this measure over time 
will constitute a sign of revitalization of unions, although we do not yet have time series data 
for all countries on coverage. We calculate the union influence indicator for both Asian 
countries and selected European countries to provide a comparative perspective. 
It is important to outline what this variable means and how it relates to union 
density. First, it is reasonable to expect that generally, union density and 
centralisation/coverage are related and mutually reinforcing. Empirically, confederations 
engaged in national level bargaining with wider coverage rates are normally 
characterized by high union density and usually have a significant influence on the social 
agenda and public policy (e.g., Sweden) Similarly, unions in decentralized systems tend 
to have lower coverage rates ((Traxler 1994; Visser 1992), with little power or very 
limited influence on national decision-making (e.g., USA). Asian unions fall into the 
latter category. However, there are exceptions to the above rule. Despite a relatively 
decentralised structure with lower union density (France, Italy), bargaining coverage 
levels are high. This low-density- high- coverage phenomenon occurs because other 
institutional mechanisms are used to extend bargaining coverage to non-union firms and 
sectors. Stable and high coverage suggests that unions continue to have an important role in 
institutional settings, even if there are temporary declines in membership (Golden, 
Wallerstein, and Lange 1999:202). 
Thus, the union influence variable and union density are likely to be associated, to 
be sure, but the strength of their association is highly dependent on institutional 
conditions. In some cases, such as France, the correlation may not be strong, while in 
others, such as Sweden, the correlation is likely to be much stronger. However, it is true 
that a minimum level of union density is necessary to generate some degree of union 
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influence (absent unions there will be no extent of bargaining). Asian countries are 
generally characterized by decentralized bargaining systems, and should exhibit low 
densities, (thus a strong correlation) but they do not, since the institutional conditions and 
rules differ dramatically. 
We would expect that in with countries with higher union influence scores, employers 
will have fewer opportunities (given union strength) to oppose union organizing (Freeman, 
1989; Western, 1997). We would also expect that with high union influence, there will be, 
ceteris paribus, less inequality, as unions or other institutions extend union wages to the non-
union sector. Similarly, high union influence is likely to be related positively to wage levels 
and to more voice in national level decision- making. Thus, we see the union influence 
vanable as a symbol of union voice in both national and local decision-making, depending on 
how high the score is. 
We reproduce, in Table 4 below, the values on our union influence variable for each of 
the countries, along with union density figures, while Figure 1 shows the relationship between 
union density and union influence. Values closest to 5 indicate high influence. 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 here 
As the Table suggests, Asian trade unions generally score much lower compared to 
their Western counterparts in terms of union influence This means that the generally 
decentralized Asian systems are characterized by very low collective bargaining coverage 
and that Asian unions do not have as much impact on the socio-economic scene relative to 
their European counterparts. This is true even in cases where union density is extremely 
high, such as in China. Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between union influence 
and union density is not linear. High influence does not guarantee high union density and 
vice versa. In some countries, such as US, Canada, UK, Japan, Singapore and the 
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Scandinavian countries, there is a close correspondence between union density and 
influence. In others, influence far exceeds density for a variety of reasons. In France and 
Spain, coverage is frequently extended by government decree. In Germany and Austria, a 
labour agreement signed by the employers' association is applied on all affiliated firms' 
employees whether or not they are union members (Wallerstein, Golden and Lange 
1999:383). In contrast in Asia, particularly the Philippines, Taiwan and China, high 
densities exist but union influence is pretty low. Thus, union density figures tend to 
exaggerate real union influence in some Asian countries while it probably understates real 
union influence in most European countries In general, Figure 1 highlights the real impact 
of unions in Asia. Both from a comparative and absolute standpoint, Asian unions have 
fairly low influence. 
However, there is variation within Asia. Figure 2, which magnifies the Asian portion 
of Figure 1 illustrates this variation. There are two clusters in terms of union influence in 
Asia. Japan, Singapore, and Korea have low densities but score more on union influence 
relative to India and Philippines, whose densities are higher than Japan, Korea, and 
Singapore, but where influence is much lower Taiwan appears closer to the Indian/Philippine 
pattern, while China is a clear outlier, with very high density but a very low influence score. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Summary 
The data on both union density and our new variable, union influence, suggest the 
following conclusions. There is some variation across Asian countries in terms of union 
growth and decline prior to the 1990s. There is however, commonality across Asia in 
terms of union decline in the 1990s as shown by union density figures. The data also 
suggest while Asian labour movements, on average, do not lag behind their Western 
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European or North American counterparts in terms of union density, they certainly do so 
in terms of union influence In terms of our union influence measure, we see two 
dominant patterns in Asia: one pattern where union influence corresponds somewhat to 
union density, and a second pattern where union density differs dramatically from union 
influence scores. One problem with our measure of union influence is that our coverage 
data is not time-series data—we only have it for one year. Time-series data on this 
variable is not available. Finally, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to present an 
extensive validation of the union influence variable, we find that, as expected, it is 
negatively related to a measure of inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) in this 
sample. This and other validation results are available from the authors on request. 
In the next section we will attempt to understand what accounts for the different 
patterns of union growth and decline prior to the 1990s, the commonality in terms of 
union decline post 1990s, and the variation in union influence within Asia and the lower 
scores on this variable (relative to Western nations) generally. 
Logics of Action and Institutional Contexts 
We argue in this section that the answers to the questions posed above can be 
found in the vastly differing and changing institutional contexts in which Asian unions 
operate. To describe these contexts, we rely on the logics of action framework suggested 
by Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002), and on prior research on change and transformation in 
Asian industrial relations (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002) in which the institutional context 
is of prime importance. 
The Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002) argument is that national industrial relations 
configurations (institutions, policies and practices) reflect the interplay of three 
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underlying logics: the logic of industrial peace, the logic of competition, and the logic of 
employment-income protection The central idea is that the relative strengths of each of 
these logics vary over time. Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002) and Kuruvilla and Enckson 
(2002) demonstrate how the logic of industrial peace underlay the development of most 
industrial relations configurations in Asian nations in the 1940s and 1950s. Often the 
primary focus of Industrial Relations (IR) policy was to deal with or reduce industrial 
conflict, and institutions and laws were configured for that purpose. However, with 
outward looking development strategies and increased competition associated foreign 
direct investment and trade, the logic of competition has assumed greater influence, causing 
a reconfiguration of IR institutions, policies and practices, which, in many cases, changed 
the balance of power between employers and unions. An example of changes would be laws 
and policies that helped employers manage their workplaces more flexibly, or the 
suppression of union activity. The logic of employment-income protection (E-I) becomes 
important when either states or unions articulate the need for some degree of employment 
or income protection, such as protection against layoffs, increased unemployment benefits 
and increased training and retraining. Often the support for this logic grows after the effects 
of the logic of competition are felt, such as the increase in unemployment due to 
restructuring. We now confine ourselves to examine how these logics have affected unions 
in each of the countries, ordering them by the clusters shown in Figure 2. 
Japan 
The salient features of the Japanese industrial relations system are well known, and 
have included enterprise unions, lifetime employment systems, broad-based training, and 
seniority based wages (see Berggren, 1993, Jacoby, 1985, Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002, for 
descriptions of the Japanese system). Thus, it was both bargaining structures and the internal 
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labour markets developed by Japanese firms that are reflective of underlying logics. The 
logic of industrial peace was reflected in the stability provided by the national level wage 
negotiations via the spring-time Shunto, and collaborative labour-management relations at 
the firm level engendered by enterprise unions and legislation on joint labour-management 
committees at the workplace. The logic of employment-income protection was reflected in 
the lifetime employment system, particularly for the 30% of workers in large keiretsu. The 
logic of competition was reflected through various institutions and policies. These included 
the system of production organisation, subcontracting, and the Keiretsu system that permitted 
the "shukko" practice (the transfer of workers from one company in the keiretsu to another) 
resulting in flexible use of human resources, but also helping to sustain the lifetime 
employment promise). Several authors have suggested that from the 1960s to the early 1990s, 
the key outcome of the Japanese IR system was the simultaneous achievement of both 
stability and flexibility (Dore 1986; Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2002), suggesting that the 
relative strengths of the different logics were roughly in balance. As industrialization grew, 
Japanese unions flourished reaching a high of 35% density in the 1970s. Since then, there has 
been a steady decline in union density, due primarily to the shift from industry to services 
(there was no major change in institutional features). In 1960, 23.6% of the workforce was 
employed in industry, while 27.5% was employed in the service sector. In 1980, the 
figures were 34.6% and 54.4% respectively, and by 1990, the figures were 33% and 62% 
respectively. 
By the late 1990s, all aspects of the Japanese system have been undergoing 
transformation (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2002). Large firms have broken and continue 
to break the lifetime employment norm and have changed hiring practices (with more 
mid career hires and short-term employment contracts), and there are changes in 
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organizational structure towards flatter organisations, eliminating the dual hierarchy 
system that has existed for decades. There have been changes in corporate governance 
(Yamakawa 1999:11), performance is increasingly a bigger determinant of pay than 
seniority (Lincoln and Nakata 1997:48), and there is increased wage variation and 
reduction in pay (Benson, 1998:212; Department of Labour 1998:4). Clearly, these 
changes suggest the dominance of the logic of competition in the 1990s. And, trade 
unions have been weakened as a consequence. As Morishima (1999) notes, "unions in 
Japan are currently facing a difficult time with increased membership losses and 
decreasing membership loyalty" (p. 11), while Rengo (the predominant peak level 
federation) is making efforts to strengthen the industry federations to make up for the 
weaknesses of enterprise unions by pushing for unification of industrial federations. 
Thus, the logic of competition is ascendant in Japan, and the logic of E-I Protection, 
which was partly a function of the strong internal labour markets, has become weaker 
during the last decade, resulting in some decline in union density. 
Singapore 
Singapore's industrial relations system has not experienced rapid or fundamental 
change (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002). The basic contours of the system remained quite 
stable since the 1970s, characterized by a tripartite industrial relations structure with joint 
decisions by representatives of labour, employersandgovemment on a number of subjects, 
notably wages through the tripartite national wages council. The close ties between the 
ruling party (Peoples Action Party) and the unions (National Trade Union Congress) ensured 
that tripartism was successful. Stability was a key goal of the IR system (Chiang, 1988), 
reflective of the importance of the logic of industrial peace. There was a focus on dealing 
with conflict. In case of a strike, a call for mediation or third party intervention would result 
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in the strike being prohibited. Similarly, wage stability was achieved through the efforts of 
the tripartite National Wages Council 
However, some institutions and rules reflected the logic of competition. The scope of 
collective bargaining is restricted by legislation ~ bargaining over transfers, promotions, 
layoffs, andjob assignments are not allowed (although some employers and union routinely 
bargain on these matters). Thus, this institutional environment (for further details of the 
environment see Leggett 1993) provided employers with both stability and flexibility at the 
workplace, while unions remained content with their voice at the national level. This voice 
has enabled unions to influence the introduction of policies that are consistent with the logic 
of employment income protection, then and now. For example, during the Asian financial 
crisis layoffs were minimized as a result of tripartite agreement, but employers were provided 
financial relief through an agreement that reduced their contributions (temporarily) to the 
Provident Fund System (government run retirement benefits). Further, consistent with this 
logic, Singapore has made training and retraining a national priority, with a national 
integrated approach to skills development that is noteworthy (Kuruvilla, Erickson, and 
Hwang, 2002). 
Singaporean unions have not witnessed any sudden decline in union density that 
other nations in Asia have faced in the 1990s. Rather, our data show a steady decline in 
unionization over the years that is consistent with the shift in employment from industry to 
services. Employment in the industrial sector decreased from 41% of the workforce in 1980 
to 32% in 1997, while the service sector accounted for an increased share of employment 
(from 56.8% in 1980 to 68% in 1997). The decline is likely to be sharper in 2002 however, 
given the recent job losses —almost 20,000 workers are expected to lose their jobs through 
layoffs due to the low economic growth (The Economist 2001). 
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Korea 
After years of repression of unions, democratization in 1987 resulted in a surge in 
union organizing, and militancy. Union density increased from 12% to almost 18% by 
1990, alternative union federations were formed, the scope of bargaining expanded 
substantially, and trade unions, confronted with a management unused to collective 
bargaining, were able to use their economic power to win substantial nominal wage 
increases (75.2% for all industries during 1988-1990, Park and Lee (1995:7); Shin and 
Wailes, 1997:3). These developments highlight the importance of the logic of employment 
and income protection in the 1987-1991 period (See Park and Lee 1993, and KuruviUa and 
Erickson 2002 for more detailed reviews of the Korean system). In response, employers 
accelerated the process of restructuring, as the low cost competitive model was no longer 
viable. This threatened employment and union density (see Table 1), reflecting an increase 
in strength of the logic of competition. The Asian financial crisis beginning in 1997 also 
resulted in a wave of bankruptcies, restructuring efforts and declining employment. The 
IMF bailout of the South Korean economy paved the way for far-reaching changes in 
industrial relations in 1998 (Park, 1998). Significantly, labour was given participation in 
national decisions through the creation of a Tripartite commission. The Commission 
reached an agreement—a social pact for dealing with the economic crisis, with several key 
decisions on industrial relations. These included (apart from recognizing the KCTU, an 
alternative union federation), the establishment of an unemployment insurance fund ($3 
billion) coupled with expansion in the amount and periods of unemployment benefits, 
collective bargaining nghts for the public sector from 1999 onwards, the freedom of labour 
unions to be active politically. These changes are consistent with an E-I protection logic 
However, the commission also revised labour laws to permit layoffs (including advance 
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notification of intended layoffs, obligations of the employer in the case of layoffs), and the 
ability to use temporary labour for periods up to one year. In addition, the agreement 
outlawed the long-standing practice of employers paying the wages of full time union 
leaders. As is evident, these decisions reflect the importance of the logic of competition. 
The restructuring process and the financial crisis have weakened unions, although 
the fall in union membership in Korea is not easy to detect, since there has been some 
increase as a consequence of allowing the teachers to organize (per the tripartite 
agreement). In addition, perhaps quicker than in many other countries, employment in the 
industrial sector in Korea has started shrinking dramatically post 1997 as Korea moved 
away from low costs as a source of competitive advantage and also because Korean firms 
have relocated to lower cost areas This would lead to more union decline The service 
sector, in contrast, has accounted for a steadily increasing share of employment from 28% 
in 1960 to 54% today. To some extent, the decline in manufacturing unions is illustrated by 
the fact that job security was the primary bargaining issue in 1998 in Korea (Kuruvilla and 
Erickson, 2002). 
India 
India is a case that our new measure of union influence does not capture very well. 
Indian union density is not that high and its union influence score is extremely low, 
although Indian unions perhaps have the most supportive institutional environment in Asia, 
and have the opportunities to increase their strength given the steady growth in employment 
in the industrial sector. The logic of industrial peace and the logic of employment-income 
protection anchored the development of industrial relations institutions and policies after 
independence in 1947. It was the strong ties between unions and political parties, within a 
context of inward looking import substitution industrialization, that resulted in labour 
friendly policies. The Factories Act of 1948 laid down highly developed standards of 
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safety, health, and working conditions, including mandated child care facilities at large 
factories. There was a strong focus on dispute prevention and strikes or lockouts had to be 
withdrawn if conciliation or mediation was initiated by one of the parties. Laws were 
extremely protective of workers. For example, the industrial disputes act (1948) required 
that employers needed prior permission of the government to layoff (layoffs were for a 
temporary period only and employees were paid a portion of their wags during layoff), or to 
retrench workers (permanent layoffs) or even close industries. Such permission was most 
often denied by government, given the connections between unions and political parties. 
(See DeSousa 1999 for a more detailed description of the development of Indian labour 
law). 
Thus, unions, despite their relatively small numbers were protected in the 
workplace and retained considerable influence at the national level through their ties with 
political parties, and via their high density in the public sector. 
Economic liberalization in 1990 has brought about a sea change in industrial relations 
practices (see Venkatratnam 1993 for details on the changes). On the one hand, employers, 
faced with increased competition have become more aggressive in their labour relations. In 
several key industries and firms, union membership has declined as employers have reduced 
manpower through voluntary retirements, as well as increasing subcontracting. On the other 
hand, there is an increased schism between the unions and their traditional allies, the political 
parties. The former opposed economic liberalization while the latter (all parties) supported 
it. Most importantly, individual state governments are attempting to change labour laws at 
the state level in order to make it more attractive to foreign investors, resulting in a new 
employer-business coalition. There are insistent calls from both foreign investors and 
employers for revamping labour law to make layoffs and retrenchments easy (referred to as 
"exit" policy), a proposal that is pending at parliament. Clearly, the logic of competition is 
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increasing in strength in India, and the institutional environment is less favourable to unions. 
Although we do not have clear national data showing union decline, data from individual 
states show clear evidence of decline (Das 2000). 
Philippines 
Consistent with the logic of industrial peace, labour laws in the Philippines were 
modeled after those in the United States. During the import substitution phase of Philippines 
development (1945-1960), unions grew in the newly established industries. However, with 
the accession of President Marcos and the consequent martial law, labour unions were 
suppressed. The martial law period also contributed to the fragmentation of an already 
fragmented labour movement, with several federations opposed to martial law in opposition 
against the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) which Marcos supported 
Currently, although the Philippines claims approximately 8000 unions with a total 3 million 
members, these unions are divided amongst 173 different federations and labour centers. 
Although many labour laws were restored at the end of the martial law period, the 
unions, weakened by fragmentation and their strength sapped by martial law confronted an 
export oriented industrialization policy based on the competitive advantage of low labour 
costs. Thus, employers' policies and practices tended to be based on the logic of competition, 
and the consequent restructuring, particularly in the early years of 1990, weakened the labour 
movement further. Two trends in practices have particularly affected unions. The first is the 
extensive subcontracting, which has created a large pool of casual and temporary workers 
with little protection. Writers such as Barranco-Fernando (1995) use the terms 
"casualization, subcontracting, and informalization of the labour force" a term which unions 
and activists use extensively in their protests. The second is the tendency of firms to follow 
aggressive anti-union practices, particularly in the electronics sector, which is the largest 
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export industry. Regional governors too have created anti-union export regions in the 
Philippines (Kuruvilla, Erickson, Anner, Amante, Ofreneo,and Ortiz 2000:36). 
While union density has declined due to these activities, collective bargaining has not 
flourished either (Ofreneo 1994). Most importantly however, only about 600,000 workers 
are shown as being covered by collective bargaining agreements in data published by the 
Department of Labor for 1996. This has reduced to 535,000 in 1999. The Asian financial 
crisis has accelerated the restructuring, resulting in what Kuruvilla et. al. (2000:48) call an 
'increasingly small core of permanent workers who work under functional flexibility 
strategies, and a growing periphery of workers who are the subjects of numerical flexibility 
strategies. The logic of competition clearly dominates in the Philippines. Finally, given that 
all candidates friendly to the labour movement lost their seats in government during the last 
election, we cannot expect changes in policies consistent with the E-I protection logic either. 
Thus, the environment for unions is not positive 
China 
Until 1978, Chinese IR policy reflected the logic of E-I protection to a great degree. 
Under the well known "iron rice bowl" system (Chiu and Frenkel 2000; Littler and Lockett 
1983, Warner 1987), employees were allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which 
guaranteed lifetime employment and a wide range of benefits, including housing and 
education. Wage levels were set centrally and the Party played a supervisory role in the 
factory. All large industries were owned by the state, and they were unionized by the 
ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions) The ACFTU primarily served as a 
transmission belt for state ideology, but was also responsible for worker welfare at the 
workplace. Through a system of workers congresses, workers did have some strategic input 
into enterprise business plans. It is this background that resulted in union density figures at 
about 70%. 
20 
The shift in economic strategy begun in 1978 has resulted in changes in the 
institutional environment facing Chinese unions (Chiu and Frenkel 2000). First, state-owned 
enterprises were given autonomy to run their business and make profits. The government 
withdrew the centralized wage scales and job allocation and permitted the employment of 
workers on short-term contracts to allow firms to pursue HR strategies that were consistent 
with their competitive position. Enterprises were also encouraged to link rewards to 
performance through the use of bonus systems (Child 1995; 163-64), and more recent 
evidence suggests that this indeed is happening in some state-owned firms (O'Leary 1998). 
There were several changes in labour law that culminating in a new comprehensive law in 
1994 that is applicable to all workers Prior to this, there were different laws for SOE's 
(state-owned industries) and foreign firms. For example a 1984 regulation required 
foreign-invested enterprises to pay between 120 and 150 percent of local enterprises in 
the same industry (though this does not seem to be followed consistently applied). 
On the one hand, the logic of competition has been gaining ground here and is 
reflected in these changes. On the other hand, the Chinese state has also been enacting rules 
and pursuing policies that are consistent with the logic of E-I protection The new 1994 law 
for example, mandates labour unions in every enterprise and provides unions with the right to 
enter into collective bargaining with employers on a prescribed range of matters including 
wages and working conditions, while also specifying employer support for union activities 
through a tax on payroll and provision of union offices. The same Act specifies minimum 
labour standards regarding wages, hours of work, health and safety, and discrimination 
against women and young workers. 
Thus, even though the laws make it easier for employers to follow competitive 
strategies, including layoffs, (which potentially reduce union membership), they also 
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provide support for Chinese unions to freely organize workers in all enterprises. 
Empirically however, union strength has been declining, and the growth of new unions is 
slow. This is due to three factors. First, despite strong protective new legislation at the 
national level, there is very weak enforcement at the local level, so it is possible to be 
non-union. Provincial and district level officials are willing to sacrifice enforcement of 
labour standards for attracting investment and generating additional jobs (Frenkel and 
Kuruvilla, 2002). Second, employers have become both aggressive and anti-union in the 
face of weak enforcement, particularly in the low-cost labour-intensive factories 
producing textiles, clothing, and footwear. In these factories, violations of working 
conditions and dismissals regulations are common. The above points testify to the 
increasing strength of the logic of competition. Third, the ACFTU itself has not been very 
active in organizing. By late 1995, there were less than 11,000 collective agreements and 
even in these cases it is unclear to what extent bargaining actually occurred (Lee 
1999:56). Evidence suggests that Chinese workers have little faith in their unions (Baek 
2000:62). Chan (1998:35) suggests that the ACFTU does not have the resources nor the 
trained personnel to vigorously organize the new FEE units. By 1997, only 35% of all 
FIE units had a union, despite the favourable legislation, and even in those places, little 
bargaining took place. These factors account for juxtaposition of high (but declining) 
density and low influence that China experiences. 
Taiwan 
Prior to democratization in 1987, and similar to China, the logics of industrial peace 
and E-I protection were important in IR policy and practice in Taiwan. Unions existed in all 
state-owned industries, and the unions' role was to support the state and economic 
development rather than to bargain. The state prior to the 1990s provided 70% of the finances 
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of the single union federation, the Chinese Federation of Labour (Pan, 1994:95), and 
controlled it quite closely. Union organizing in non-state enterprises was marginal, as a large 
majority of non-state enterprises were small paternalistic family run firms where union 
organizing was not possible. An examination of the structure of firms reveals that more than 
80% of Taiwan's factories have fewer than 300 employees. 
In 1984, the labour standards law was enacted, (which provided unions increased 
subjects to bargain over (Lee 1994) and in 1987 democratization ushered in greater freedom 
of unions from party control. Taiwan's union density climbed from 28% in 1984 to 50% in 
1995, the largest increase in union density in Asia. Whereas the 1984 labour standards law 
prescribed minimum standards regarding working conditions, consistent with the logic of E-I 
protection, the logic of competition was also evident. For example, unions were not permitted 
to bargain over the introduction of new technology and work standards. And, despite high 
union density figures, collective bargaining did not take strong root, particularly amongst 
craft unions. By 1995, there were approximately 295 collective bargaining agreements for 
industrial unions and about 6 for craft unions. Lee (1994) also suggests that unions, in 
general are not effective at handling employee grievances, and his survey in 1987 showed 
that fully 60%) of those who joined unions did so at the employers' request. 
If coverage is low, then it begs the question of why density is high. The reason has to 
do with the labour insurance and health system for craft workers that the state introduced. 
The insurance system was provided only through the craft unions, so many craftsmen joined 
these unions Kuruvilla, Das, Kwon and Kwon (2001) shows how the increase in craft union 
membership corresponded with increase in labour insurance participation. And, in fact, the 
increase in craft union membership actually masked a slight decline in industrial unions 
during this period. Since 1995, membership of craft unions has also begun to decline, as the 
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state introduced a new health insurance law that made the labour insurance system less 
attractive for craft workers. 
In addition to that decline, a number of other factors threaten the Taiwanese labour 
movement. One is the newly elected Democratic Progressive Party's desire to alter labour 
legislation. This would force the KMT dominated unions (who have been subsidized by the 
party ) to collect dues from their members, a key threat to union density. Second, the rise of 
the DPP has brought about a divided labour movement, given the rise of a new federation 
(Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions TCTU). Third, the structural shift from 
manufacturing to services continues. The contribution of manufacturing to GDP declined 
from 46.3% in 1985 to 36.3% in 1995, while the contribution of the service sector to 
GDP increased from 47.9% to 60.2%. Employment in manufacturing declined from 40% 
in 1990 to 28.5% in 1997. 
Fourth, there is the increase in product market competition for Taiwanese products, 
forcing firms to lower costs. One the one hand, Taiwanese firms are requesting a loosening of 
the labour standards prescribed in the 1984 law, particularly in terms of pensions, and 
working hours, as part of their efforts at restructuring to compete effectively in the 
international market (Pan 2002). On the other hand, there has been a large relocation in 
manufacturing from Taiwan to the mainland to take advantage of lower Chinese labour costs. 
In the last year alone, the combined effects of the economic slowdown and relocation to 
China have caused an increase in unemployment from 2.9% (June 2000) to 5.3% in 
September 2001. Thus, both industrial and craft unions can expect further declines. 
Summary 
The institutional features in each nation help us understand why most Asian countries 
have much lower scores on the union influence variable than their "Western" counterparts. 
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And, although the union influence variable does not fully capture union activities at the 
political level, we have seen in these cases that Asian unions do not have much political 
voice, Singapore and India excepted. The cases also suggest that the patterns of union 
growth and decline until the mid-1990s are related to idiosyncratic factors in most countries 
but also consistent with the change in economic structure in Japan, Singapore and Korea. 
Most importantly, it appears that logic of competition appears to be gaining strength 
in the 1990s, in all countries, resulting in policies, or employer practices, that are detrimental 
to the labour movement. Almost without exception, the economic environment poses threats 
to unions. In Japan, where unions have been relatively strong (in terms of both union density 
and union influence), the recession of the last decade has resulted in the breakdown of 
traditional employment relations structures such as lifetime employment that has negatively 
affected union density. In Singapore, the financial crisis and consequent slowdowns have 
resulted in job losses in unionized sector. In Korea, restructuring by employers has reduced 
union numbers dramatically, while industrial relocation to the mainland from Taiwan has 
also reduced union density and increased unemployment. And although the Chinese economy 
is growing and labour laws are favourable, for vanous reasons, the unions are not making any 
gains. In India established unions are threatened via employers numerical flexibility 
strategies coupled with changes in the union-government relationship In the Philippines, the 
"casualization" of the workforce due to numerical flexibility strategies of employers have 
weakened unions considerably. It is against this context that we examine the prospects for 
revitalization below 
Prospects for Revitalization 
Given the patterns of union decline and the dominance of the logic of competition 
(currently) in most countries, we argue that revitalization of trade unions will depend heavily 
on two issues; a) if, by union action or government policy, IR institutions are reformed based 
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on an increasing strength of the logic of employment-income protection, andb) what unions 
do by themselves in terms of new strategies to increase their numbers, or their influence in 
both national and bargaining terms. Although these two issues are related, we discuss them 
separately. 
Are Changes in IR Institutions Likely? 
We will look here for signs of strengthening of the logic of industrial peace or the 
logic of E-I protection, either because unions have pushed for them or because governments 
have acted proactively to contain worker discontent. If the strength of this logic increases, 
then it is likely that IR and HR institutions will be reformed (at least in part) to be consistent 
with this logic. In Japan, currently, we do not see many of a strengthening of the logic of E-I 
protection Rather, as Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002) suggest, the Japanese IR system is in the 
middle of a fundamental transformation towards a direction more consistent with the logic of 
competition 
In Korea, the new industrial relations arrangements agreed to by the tripartite 
commission after the financial crisis represents a strengthening of the logic of employment-
income protection (for e.g., the introduction of unemployment insurance). But the 
strengthening in this logic is accompanied by a strengthening of the logic of competition as 
well (for e.g., the freedom of employers to layoff). 
In Singapore, the tripartite arrangement will ensure that unions have a voice, even if 
their numbers decline Further, as Wong (2001:5) suggests, unions in Singapore have shifted 
their priority from employment security to "employability"- which we think is a more 
dynamic position that is consistent with the E-I protection logic. The NTUC in Singapore has 
commenced several programs such as the Skills Redevelopment Program, which focuses on 
the older and less skilled workers who have not been able to keep pace with changing 
technology (Wong 2001). The union has also set up an educational and training fund, raised 
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through donations from members, to help workers take up training on their own. The 
Singapore government has offered to match every dollar raised with three dollars from public 
funds. 
In India the logic of employment-income protection is manifesting itself in several 
ways. To alleviate the negative employment effects of restructuring, a National Renewal 
Fund was established in 1997 to provide counseling andjob training, the first step in an 
active labour market policy that is likely to be deepened (Venkatratnam and Naidu, 1999). 
Although the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government announced plans in 2001 to change 
labour legislation to promote workplace flexibility, this has not yet been discussed and 
ratified in parliament. Instead the government introduced a policy to increase separation 
benefits, in line with an employment-income protection logic. In addition, the unions and 
their political supporters have maintained legislation protecting employees in the formal 
economy from layoffs and dismissals, and from other arbitrary management action (see 
Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002). 
In the Philippines, following the Asian financial crisis there was a surge in 
tripartism where the unions, employers, and government issued a declaration asking 
employers to use layoffs only as a last resort. Ofreneo (2000) observes that this was 
successful, although others argue that there is nothing to sustain such tripartism. The 
resurgence of tripartism after the Asian financial crisis was not confined only to the 
Philippines. It was strong in Korea, and even stronger in Malaysia, which had also seen 
declines in union numbers in the 1990s. For a description of such resurgences after the 
financial crisis, see Erickson and Kuruvilla (2000). 
In China, the new industrial relations laws promulgated in 1994 were underpinned 
by both logics of competition and E-I income. The right of unions to enter into collective 
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bargaining agreements, financial support for the union (two percent of the wage bill of every 
firm is set aside for union expenses and the union must be provided with an office on the 
premises) and minimum labour standards regarding wages, hours of work, health and safety, 
and discrimination against women and young workers have established a strong baseline 
from which unions can revitalize themselves. However, poor implementation and lack of 
union initiative militate against a further strengthening of the E-I logic. Recognizing this, 
perhaps, the Standing Committee of the National People's congress, (the country's top 
legislative body) is currently (Dec 2001) considering six new draft laws to strengthen trade 
unions in China, including large punishments for violations of union rights Thus, despite 
Frenkel and Kuruvilla's (2002) depiction of the overwhelming strength of the logic of 
competition in China, the government is reacting to it in ways that are consistent with a 
strengthening E-I protection logic. In Taiwan, we do not yet see signs of a strengthening of 
this logic. 
Although we view these developments suggesting a strengthening of the logic of E-I 
protection as a harbinger of institutional change that might benefit unions, our assessment is 
that they are relatively small developments. The logic of competition remains dominant. It is 
possible, consistent with the Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002) argument, that the logic of E-I 
protection might increase further in strength with the continued impact of policies and 
practices consistent with the logic of competition... as things get worse there will be 
increased pressure by workers / unions for change but it is difficult to say when this might 
occur in each country 
What are Unions doing to revitalize themselves? 
Unions can also increase their influence in both the national socio-economic sphere 
and in bargaining in several different ways. We highlight below selected new trends, based 
on a review of recent literature. These trends include increases in union autonomy, a renewed 
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emphasis on organizing, changes in union structures, alliances between unions and civil 
society groups, increased member servicing, and internationalization of union activity. 
We do not claim that this is an exhaustive or representative list of what unions are 
doing. In addition, since these trends are relatively new, it is too early to gauge their impact. 
Hence we are appropriately cautious in how we interpret these trends vis-a-vis union 
revitalization. 
First, in several countries, there has been an increase in local union autonomy. In 
India, many unions in the Mumbai region have disassociated themselves from the national 
federations to pursue a more economic collective bargaining agenda (Bhattacherjee 2001). 
This represents a departure from political unionism and external leadership that has been 
characteristic of unions in the past, and represents anew kind of economic activism. In 
Korea, the increase in union autonomy first occurred after democratization, but has 
intensified since then (Song, 2001). In China, many local unions function with a high degree 
of autonomy from the ACFTU, although they must be affiliated to it (Chiu and Frenkel 
2000). With the gradual withdrawal from the KMT party in Taiwan from their labour control 
strategy (Pan 1999), and with the rise of alternative federations to the CFL, coupled with the 
elections of the DPP (Democratic Peoples Party), Taiwanese unions have become more 
independent of national federations. We interpret these movements towards independence as 
reflecting local union efforts to pursue an economic and self-interested strategy. This 
movement also represents a freedom from control by federations whose interests are often 
different from those of local unions. Further, this movement strengthens local bi-partite 
industrial relations. In a few countries where we have anecdotal evidence (e.g., India), we 
find that this independence has resulted in collective bargaining gains (Bhattacherjee, 2001). 
A second trend concerns the renewed interest in organizing in both the formal and 
informal sectors in all countries Union decline and the threats imposed by economic 
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globalization have served to stimulate union self-examination in several countries. Thus, 
there is talk of new efforts at organizing in most countries. For example, the leaders of the 
ACFTU in China have directed all union leaders to go out and organize (Frenkel and 
Kuruvilla, 2002). In some areas (e.g., export processing zones in the Philippines) there has 
been increased organizing activity. And there has been a new focus on organizing 
contingent, part-time and informal sector workers everywhere. 
Organizing the unorganized (particularly those in the informal sector) is a significant 
development. As Bhattacherjee (2001) points out, as firms follow more numerical flexibility 
strategies, there will be an increase in the informal sector workforce In India there is "no 
other way but to increase membership by organizing vulnerable workers in the informal 
sector" (Bhattacherjee 2001:1). The number of contingent workers have increased 
dramatically in Korea, and different estimates suggest that the number ranges from 25% to 
50% of the workforce in 2000 (Kim 2001), depending on how contingent workers are 
defined. Unions have made important changes in their constitutions to allow them to organize 
these workers (Song 2001), and many unions (e.g. in Chosun Hotel and AC Neilson Korea) 
have allowed the workers of subcontractors to be a part of the union. 
In Japan, the primary trade union federation (RENGO), has made organizing 
independent workers, workers in small enterprises, and part time and temporary workers 
a priority. Although by 2000 there has not been any appreciable increase in overall union 
density in Japan as a result of this new drive, there has been increase in some sectors, 
notably in the textiles and garments sector and the food and allied workers sector. The 
primary union in both sectors here is Zensen Domei (The Japanese Federation of Textile, 
Garment, Chemical, Mercantile, Food and Allied Industries Workers Unions) and the 
increase in their numbers has come primarily from organizing part time workers. 
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In several countries new unions have formed, even though overall density continues 
to decline. In Korea, there has been a growth in women's unions and teacher's unions, while 
the well documented activities of SEWA in India in the informal sector has brought about 
parallel developments in several other countries (ILO 2000), particularly amongst domestic 
workers in Hong Kong, and migrant workers in Hong Kong and the Philippines (Swider, 
2000). 
Although we think that new organizing is a sign of union revitalization, we do not 
have evidence of the success of these efforts in every country. And we are mindful of the 
problems too. As Song (2001) suggests local unions may be often too weak, in financial 
terms, to focus on extensive new organizing, and many national labour movements are not 
well endowed with funds (Suzuki, 1998). 
A third trend is the change in union structures. There is a discernible movement 
towards strengthening peak-level federations through coordination arrangements or via 
consolidation of union structures. In particular, a number of union mergers have taken place 
in Japan, (Zensen Domei is one example) and several more have been planned for the year 
2003 (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002). Further, for the first time, there is a new network of 
enterprise unions called Roren, whose objective is to coordinate bargaining against a focal 
employer. The highly fragmented Philippine Labour movement has recently commenced 
attempts at union consolidation and coordination, although the movement is slow (Kuruvilla 
et al. 2000). Union coordination has been discussed between two major federations in India 
(Hiers and Kuruvilla, 2000). In Korea, there has been some consolidation of public sector 
federations and in the banking industry, there has been a shift in the level of bargaining from 
enterprise level to industry level. 
We see these movements towards consolidation and re-centralisation as a key 
dimension of union revitalization efforts. Such consolidation, arguably, helps to increase 
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union influence at the national level The efforts in the Philippines and India are based on this 
notion, along with the need to counter the growing clout of employers. In Japan, Inoue (2000) 
suggests that the consolidation in Japan is to increase union political voice. Thus, while we 
see union autonomy as being good from a local bargaining perspective, we see the movement 
towards peak-level coordination as being important from the perspective of national voice 
and influence. 
However, the movement towards consolidation/recentralisation continues to be 
threatened by the strong pressures for decentralisation in industrial relations. The movement 
towards increased decentralisation is driven by employers in search of appropriate 
agreements to maintain competitive advantage, and this has been a worldwide trend (Katz, 
1993). The continued fragmentation of unions and rivalry between unions in many countries 
also militates against recentralisation/consolidation efforts. For example, there is not much 
hope of cooperation between the two major Korean trade union federations (Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions, and Korean Confederation of Trade Unions) In the Philippines, the 
two primary labour centers (Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and the Kilusang Mayo 
Uno), have been at loggerheads for over 15 years In India, two of the largest federations, the 
All India Trade Union Congress and the Indian National Trade Union Congress are only now 
talking about concertation, although there is rivalry amongst other federations. In Taiwan, the 
CFL (Chinese Federation of Labour), hitherto controlled by the Kuomintang party has a new 
competitor in the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU), launched in 1997, 
recognized by the government in 2000 and affiliated to the Democratic Progressive Party 
now in power. The TCTU now comprises 18 unions and represents 270,000 members. For 
Asian labour movements to strengthen themselves, these federations must work together. 
A fourth trend concerns alliances between trade unions and other civil society groups, 
notably women's organisations, and environmental groups. This is most developed in Korea, 
32 
although it is present in other nations also. A recent analysis of social movements in Korea 
(Kwon and Yee 1998), reveals that both Korean federations have been involved in alliances 
with civil society groups on a number of issues. Given in particular the growth of the 
contingent workforce, and the fact that women form the majority of that workforce, Korean 
unions have focused heavily on women's issues and have collaborated with groups such as 
Korean Working Women's Association, and Women's Link to fight discrimination. One 
successful example of the collaboration between labour unions and environmental groups has 
been the shifting of the Sa-yun dam in Ulsan. 
Other successes include union collaboration with civil society groups on the 
abolition of the national security act; solidarity for contingent workers; abolishing the 
system of headship of the family; and people's action for the reform of unjust SOFA (US 
status of forces agreement). In China, for the first time, the ACFTU has been focusing on the 
issues of women workers, cooperating with various NGO groups (ACFTU 2000). We do not 
have more information about the links between unions and civil society groups in other 
countries, but see a recent ILO report (ILO 2000) that argues that such links are growing 
everywhere. This linkage between unions and civil society groups is an important area for 
future research. 
A fifth trend is the efforts of unions to be more relevant in their members' personal 
lives, in order to retain member commitment. Union actions to meet these goals take various 
forms. In Singapore, unions have, for a long time focused on welfare benefits for members, 
such as lower priced textbooks for members, union owned cooperative stores and union 
sponsored health insurance. More recently, unions have made it a priority to work with the 
employers to improve health insurance, and to contribute to community development, 
through fund raising, volunteerism, and providing education grants to needy families (Wong 
2000). In Japan, Inoue (2000) suggests several new initiatives by Japanese unions beyond 
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their traditional focus on union provided health care and retirement plans One such initiative 
involves a new conception of life-long welfare, with help for members for marriages, births, 
housing, health management and retirement. In general, what we see here are efforts to 
broaden the attractiveness and relevance of unions to other members of society. However, the 
richer labour movements in Asia (Japan, Singapore) appear to have made more headway than 
poorer unions. 
A sixth trend relevant to the revitalization question in an increasingly globalized 
world concerns labour transnationahsm (union collaboration across national boundaries) in 
Asia. Recent reviews (Kuruvilla, 2001; Suzuki, 1998) of Asian labour transnationahsm 
suggest, on the one hand, an increase in cross border contacts generally, some successful 
bilateral union collaborations, one effort to create an Asia wide union council within a 
multinational corporation, and a general increase in cross-border communication and contact 
On the other hand, these reviews also suggest four major obstacles to transnational union 
activity. These obstacles include national legislation that restrict transnational activities; the 
absence of a well funded treasury which only Japanese and Taiwanese unions appear to have-
— Suzuki (1998) notes that richer unions tend to be more international in their outlook; the 
general unwillingness of employers to bargain at the regional level; and the absence of 
transnational bargaining bodies. 
Our own view is that the essential preconditions for successful international 
cooperation do not exist in Asia. Gordon and Turner (2000) in their book on transnational 
collaboration across unions, note that an essential precondition for the success of 
international cooperation is the need amongst unions and workers for a perception of 
interdependence. They note (p 257) "such a perception, it seems, must be based on a 
commitment to a shared goal the attainment of which is contingent on the cooperation of 
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individual organisations from different countries". Such a perception is notably absent 
amongst Asia. 
Two factors are important here. The first is that unlike in Europe and in North 
America, there are no transnational structures that will force unions to collaborate more in 
Asia. EC level institutions and laws, combined with already strong national unions, have 
resulted in the growth of transnational bargaining structures such as European works 
councils Labour transnationalism in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has not 
progressed very much, partly due to the lack of efforts by the unions themselves, and partly 
due to the absence of favourable institutions such as those in Europe. Yet, NAFTA through 
its' rules, creates "spaces" and "platforms" for union collaboration (Compa, 1997:50). In 
Asia, where the most advanced plans for regional integration are to be found in AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area), there has been no discussion with respect to labour issues. Thus, 
regionalization has not helped in creating the sense of interdependence that Gordon and 
Turner (2000) highlight. 
A second factor inhibiting the concept of interdependence is the difference in goals 
between unions and other informal groups in terms of their goals. As Kuruvilla (2001) has 
argued, transnational activity amongst citizen's groups has increased dramatically (e.g., the 
international toy campaign), but Asian unions have not been integrated into these 
transnational networks For many established unions (such as RENGO), internationalization 
means strengthening the ability to bargain on an international basis. As such, they focus on 
the already organized and established sectors in the economy. NGOs and other citizen's 
groups (e.g. the Asia Monitor Resource Center) call for international solidarity that promotes 
workers rights in unorganized and informal sectors, including small businesses that do not 
fall under most countries' labour laws. The goals of unions and informal groups are quite 
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different, although there are some small efforts being made to bridge this gap. But this divide 
also inhibits development of the sense of interdependence. 
To conclude, on the one hand, there is reason to believe that the logic of employment-
income protection may grow to an extent that IR and HR institutions may get reformed 
partially to be consistent with that logic. This may help revitalization. Further, the attention to 
organizing, consolidation of union structures, improved member servicing and increased 
transnationalism, if continued, might help stem the tide of decline. On the other hand, we do 
not know at this point when the institutional environment will change in the different 
countries, and it is clear that labour movements in all Asian countries are equally capable of 
making progress on their own revitalization efforts. And, as we argued earlier, it is still too 
early to judge the effectiveness of these new actions by unions. Based on the available 
information, we are not convinced that the trends mentioned above are, in and of themselves, 
sufficient for successful revitalization 
Conclusions 
The data reviewed in this paper suggest that while union density varied considerably, 
all the countries in our sample experienced a decline in union membership during the 1990s. 
Despite varying levels of union density, most Asian unions score very low on a new measure 
of union influence, in both absolute terms and compared to unions in the West. We relate 
both these findings to changes in the strength of the logics underlying IR and HR institutions, 
policies, and practices in these countries. We find that the logic of competition has increased 
in strength during the 1990s, causing policies and practices to be reformed in terms of that 
logic, which partially explains the declines in union density in the 1990s. The prospect for 
revitalization depends on changes in the underlying logics as well as actions by unions. 
While there is cause for hope in that unions have begun a process that may help them 
rejuvenate, the new strategies they have adopted have not yet had much impact in stemming 
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revitalization. However, one caveat is that more in depth comparative field research on what 
labour movements in Asia are doing is necessary to make a more definitive prediction. 
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Table 2: Bargaining level f87-'96) and Coverage Rate ('80-'95) 
Countries 
China 
India* 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Australia 
Austria* 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark* 
Finland* 
France* 
Germany 
Italy* 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway* 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Bargaining levels 
(N/S, C) 
C 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
C 
c 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
N/S 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S, C 
N/S.C 
N/S, C 
N/S.C 
N/S, C 
N/S 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
N/S,C 
N/S.C 
N/S, C 
N/S, C 
Dominant levels 
(N/S, C) 
C 
N/S, C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
N/S 
N/S 
C 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S, C 
N/S 
N/S, C 
N/S 
C 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S 
C 
c 
Trend 
N/S C 
i 
s i 
s i 
i 
s s 
d i 
s i 
s i 
d i 
S i 
s i 
s i 
s i 
s i 
s i 
d i 
i i 
i i 
s i 
i 
d i 
d i 
Col Barg 
Coverage (%) 
15.10 
2.00 
24.00 
17.00 
2.60 
3.70 
18.80 
3.40 
82.70 
98.00 
90.00 
37.00 
69.00 
95.00 
90.70 
91.00 
83.30 
76.00 
55.00 
74.70 
73.30 
76.70 
87.00 
52.00 
54.70 
20.70 
Notes: 1) N/S = National/sectoral level. C = Company/plant level. 2) d = Decrease, i = Increase, s = 
Stable. 
*India was adjusted according to Kuruvilla & Erickson (2002) Austria, 
Sweden were adjusted according to Torben Iversen (1999). OECD (1999) 
(1984), and Calmfors aud Driffil (1988). 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Schmitter, (1981) Cameron. 
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Table 3: The Degree of Centralisation Based on Dominant Levels 
Bargaining 
N/S 
N/S&C 
N/S&C 
N/S&C 
c 
Levels Dominant Levels 
^ N / S 
-»N/S 
^ N/S & C 
^ C 
-^ r 
Centralisation 
Degree 
5 
4 
3 
2 
i 
N=National, S=Sectoral, C=Company Level 
46 
- J 
.* 
C 
B. 
% 
0 
o 
1 o 
II 
O 
o 
if C 
--ri td 
(5 
g. B. 
tw 
O 
o 
** o> i 
<T> 
* 
CO 
<K S 
= 
3 09 
C£ 
§ 
o 
1 
* 
c 
3 
a 
3 
en 
5' 
> 
* • 
O 
3 
o 
O 
i - ^ 
^ H5 
© 
^e 
VO 
o 
u 
H. 
VO 
""^  O 
~ 
B 
i — 
^ 
- j jiS 
s 
^ UJ 
i* 
VO 
O 
' j f i 
-^  i i 
3 
n . 
S ' 
^ _ i 
o 
00 
o 
c 
> 
» tt 3 H § <t> 3 
a. rr 3 ft* 
i s §" 1 & i S* I § I 
°
 :
 * i I £ s I 9 
ti. to o "o a J iS* pj ft 2 v: to 3 » g 
3 » 
oc 
b 
4^- t o 
^ 9° © t*J 
<X 
4^ 
*~) 
( J J 
U) 
-^ 
U) 
^ 1 
b U) 
t o 
b 
o o o o o o o o 
tO <Vi <Vi CO --J --J --J '.Vi -O, 
O J ^ K > -g iji W Ji ^ Q\ 
-J -J © O - J ^ - J O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O 
bo o^ o^ o^ b\ ^  '^o '^o bo b J—< b 
< ^ © - J © O O © © - J . U C 0 - 0 . 
t o 
b 
K> w 
b b 
'-JI 
b 
4s> 
b 
4s> 
b 
'-JI 
b 
to 
a 
4^ 
b O O O O O O O O O O O O 
o 
4^ 
1 — 
b 
i — is . W 
U> b 
t o w 
<1 
•— 
O 
w 
b 
t O U > t 0 4 ^ . < ^ O W . P i — 0 0 0 
ys as ""*J '•*! ** '<i "os 'So b b us b 
" - " - IO — CT\ 
to w 5\ oo w 
b to w bo 4^  
o o o o o 
b — to o — 
W - g J i NJ 'J< 
a-, o o o — 
^ K) K) W i -
O O © © © 
o o o o o 
Q <*3 "#k O t-< 
OJ .u co a\ (vi 
a n 
B < Cd 
u j ' . w ; c« 
CD * 
to * 
-. 
e 
s 
o m 
3 
3 & 
T l 
c 
3 
-
ra 
t o 
2 
II 
c^  
IO 
^ 
n 
c^  
CO 
£. 
00 
r-f-
2 
o 
c s 
* 
* 
3 , 
o' 
3 
3^ 
a 3 
3 
O 
H) 
5) 
B 
s 
n 
re 
Dp re 
^^  n 
1 
n 
S 
g" 
w 
^ =tt 
Figure 1. Union Density and Union Influence: All Countries. 
Note: To facilitate comparison, we standardised the two variables by changing the union influence variable 
range from 0-5 to 0-100 to be consistent with union density- percentages. 
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Figure 2. Union Density and Union Influence: Asian Countries 
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Union Influence (Standardised Index) 
Note: To facilitate comparison, we standardised the two variables by changing the union influence variable 
range from 0-5 to 0-100 to be consistent with union density percentages. In addition, this is a highly 
magnified version of the Asian portion of the above Figure. 
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